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GABALDON v. SANCHEZ: NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE LAW OF NUISANCE,
NEGLIGENCE AND TRESPASS

In Gabaldon v. Sanchez,' the Court of Appeals held that a subdivider who failed to undertake statutorily required terrain management was not liable for nuisance, negligence, or trespass if windblown topsoil from his leveled subdivision accumulated on an
adjacent landowner's property in such amounts that it clogged irrigation ditches, damaged crops and made it necessary to re-level the
land. The court summarily concluded that the defendant subdivider
had a legal right to clear his land, had not been negligent in clearing
it, and thus was not liable for damages caused by windblown sand
and dirt. This note will summarize the court's discussion in Gabaldon, outline the analyses required by nuisance, negligence and trespass law, and discuss the court's failure to apply those analyses.
FACTS OF THE CASE
According to the transcript of record on appeal, 2 the plaintiffs,
the Gabaldons, owned 32 acres of land in Los Chavez in Valencia
County.' They leveled the land in 1970 at a cost of about $3,000'
and then leased it. The lessors planted the land in alfalfa, from which
they could take three to four cuttings a year.' In 1974 the defendant, Sanchez, bought approximately 85 acres of land adjoining the
Gabaldon property for subdivision. 6 He leveled it in June of 1975
after his subdivision had been approved by the Valencia Board of
County Commissioners."
The facts which led the Gabaldons to file suit because of Sanchez's
subdivision activities were summarized by the court of appeals from
the trial court's findings.8 The court noted that after stripping the
1. Gabaldon v. Sanchez, 92 N.M. 224, 585 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1978). Judge Hernandez
dissented from the decision by Judges Sutin and Lopez. He would have sustained the trial
court's finding of nuisance on the grounds that defendant's conduct substantially interfered
with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land. 92 N.M. 229, 585 P.2d 1110.
2. On file at the University of New Mexico Law Library.
3. Facts concerning the Gabaldons' land are taken from the Transcript of Proceedings at
pp. 197-199 of the Record.
4. Id. at 215.
5. Id. at 199.
6. Id. at 230.
7. Id. at 182.
8. 92 N.M. at 225, 585 P.2d at 1106.
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natural vegetation from his land, Sanchez failed to undertake the
terrain management program he was required to and had agreed to
undertake. The Gabaldons' land was damaged by windblown topsoil
because of Sanchez's failure to undertake the required terrain management. Supplementing this bare factual summary with information
about the New Mexico Subdivision Act 9 and some of the evidence
considered by the trial court provides greater detail for evaluating the
court's decision.
The Subdivision Act requires subdividers to have their proposed
subdivisions approved by the board of county commissioners before
leasing or selling the land.I 0 Each county was required to adopt
subdivision regulations covering specific areas of concern, including
terrain management, and any other areas the county chose to regulate in order to ensure proper planning.' 1 The Subdivision Act specifies the minimum information subdividers must disclose to prospective purchasers in a disclosure statement that must be reviewed and
approved by the board of county commissioners.' 2 Subdividers must
provide the services, including terrain management, described in their
disclosure statements. 1 3 Before a board approves a subdivision, it
must determine whether a subdivider can fulfill his disclosure statement proposals and whether those proposals meet the county's subdivision regulations. In determining this, the board must request
opinions from various state and local agencies, including the local soil
and water conservation district.'"
Sanchez submitted a disclosure statement for his proposed subdivision to the Valencia Board of County Commissioners [hereinafter
the Board]. The East Valencia Natural Resource Conservation District [hereinafter NRCD] would not approve Sanchez's first proposal
for terrain management.' I Sanchez then proposed a re-vegetation
program which included installation of a sprinkling system.' 6 The
NRCD found his new proposal met its specific concern with protection of the land from extreme spring winds, but informed the Board
that it couldn't recommend approval of Sanchez's plat until "some
method of soil stabilization is complete."' " In his disclosure state9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § §47-5-9, 47-6-1 to 47-6-28 (1978). The court's references to the
Subdivision Act are to N.M. Stat. Ann. § §70-5-1 to 70-5-29 (Supp. 1975). This note will
refer to the Subdivision Act as codified in the 1978 Compilation.
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-6-8 (1978).
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-6-9 (1978).
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-6-17 (1978).
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-6-11 (1978).
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-6-11(E) (1978).
15. Transcript of Proceedings at p. 133 of Record.
16. Id. at 134.
17. Record at 23. Letter from Davila, Chairman of the East Valencia Natural Resource
Conservation District, dated Dec. 13, 1974.
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ment, Sanchez said the NRCD members "agree that the terrainmanagement plan proposed for La Ladera Estates is adequate."' 8 He
did not indicate that the NRCD would not recommend approval
because he had not carried out his terrain management proposal. The
Board approved the subdivision despite the NRCD's adverse opinion.' 9
Sanchez never implemented the terrain management plan described in his disclosure statement. Wind stripped the bare topsoil
from his subdivision and deposited it on the Gabaldon property.
Sanchez cleared the Gabaldons' irrigation ditch of sand in 1975,2 o
cleared half the ditch of sand in 1976, but then refused to remove
any more sand. 2 ' An official of the USDA Soil Conservation Service
testified he had gridded the Gabaldon property prior to trial in 1977
and estimated that approximately 5,000 cubic yards of sand and dirt
had blown onto their land from Sanchez's subdivision. He said the
amount of dirt represented by that figure could be visualized by
approximating it to 1,000 dump truck loads of dirt.2 2 Crops on the
Gabaldon land were damaged by the blowing topsoil itself, and the
accumulations of dirt and sand both on their land and in their ditch
contributed to the damage by interfering with irrigation. Estimates
of damage due to crop loss varied. 2 3 One witness testified that the
Gabaldons would have to re-level their land in order to irrigate properly again. 2 4
COURT PROCEEDINGS

When Sanchez refused to again clear their ditch, the Gabaldons
sued for damages, and sought an order directing Sanchez both to
clear their land of the accumulated dirt and to take steps, including
re-vegetation, to ensure soil from his land would not continue to
blow onto their property. 2 ' The district court ruled that Sanchez
had violated the Subdivision Act and that his acts also constituted
nuisance, negligence and trespass. The Gabaldons were awarded
$3,000 in damages plus costs. Sanchez was ordered to implement a
terrain management program in compliance with the Subdivision Act
and to either remove the dirt accumulated along the Gabaldons'
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Record at 17. Defendant's Disclosure Statement.
Transcript of Proceedings at p. 234 of Record.
Id. at 201-202.
Id. at 207-208.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 193-195, 203-205.
Id. at 157, 166.
Plaintiffs' Complaint at p. 5 of Record.
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irrigation ditch or take steps to ensure it did not fall into the
2
ditch. 6

The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held
first, that the Subdivision Act does not provide for private causes of
action and could not support the award of damages and injunctive
relief to plaintiffs."7 The court also held that defendant was not
liable to plaintiffs for nuisance, negligence or trespass because he had
the legal right to clear his land and was not negligent in clearing it.
THE SUBDIVISION ACT
2
The Subdivision Act had two possible uses in Gabaldon."

The

first use was rejected by the court when it found the Subdivision Act
did not create a private cause of action that enabled those injured by
violations of the Act to sue under it. A second use of the statute was
not addressed by the court. The Subdivision Act could have been
found to create a standard of care, and violation of the Act could
then either establish negligence per se or be used as evidence on the
issue of negligence. This use of the statute is addressed below under
the discussion of negligence.
The trial court specifically concluded that Sanchez had violated

the Subdivision Act and that the Act "was promulgated to protect a
2
class of which plaintiffs are members.""9

The trial court did not

indicate whether Sanchez's violation was a separate basis for awarding relief to plaintiffs, or whether it simply was one indication of

negligence. On appeal, both parties considered that the trial court's
decision was based at least in part on plaintiffs' ability to recover
under the Subdivision Act.' I The court of appeals viewed this as the
26. Judgment of the Court at p. 79 of Record.
27. The court did "believe, however, that defendant should be compelled to comply with
the Act. This result can be obtained if plaintiffs will convince either the district attorney of
Valencia County or the attorney general to proceed for injunctive relief or mandamus." 92
N.M. at 226, 585 P.2d at 1107.
28. The Subdivision Act arguably could have been used in a third way that was not
advanced before either the trial court or the court of appeals. Even if violation of the
Subdivision Act does not support a private cause of action, it might support an injunction
for public nuisance. Other jurisdictions have found that the open, continuous, public and
intentional violation of a public statute is a public nuisance. State v. Rabinowitz, 85 Kan.
, 79 S.E. 614,
118 P. 1040, 1043 (1911); Knight v. Foster, 163 N.C. 329,
-,
841,
615 (1913). Private citizens can sue to enjoin public nuisances in New Mexico, both as a
statutory right [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-8-8 (1978)] and a common law right (Fink, Private
Nuisance in New Mexico, 4 N.M.L. Rev. 127-28 (1974). To sue under the common law of
public nuisance, a plaintiff must have suffered particular injury because of the nuisance.]. If
the court of appeals had accepted the view that continued violation of a public statute is a
public nuisance, then Sanchez created a public nuisance by his continued refusal to comply
with the Subdivision Act.
29. Conclusion of Law No. 2, Decision of the Court at p. 77 of Record.
30. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at p. 5. Appellee's Reply Brief at p. 6.
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issue before it, 3 1 and ruled that the Subdivision Act did not create
private causes of action for violations of the statute.
The court's decision was based on Section 47-6-26 of the Subdivision Act, which provides in part:
In addition, the district attorney or the attorney general may bring
mandamus to compel compliance with the provisions of this act.
However, nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting any
common-law right of any person in any court relating to subdivisions.
The court was correct in finding that this section precludes private
causes of action under the statute. The New Mexico Supreme Court
has recognized "that, where a statute gives cause of action, and designates the persons who may sue, they alone can sue.... "32 The
principle has been recognized elsewhere. 3 3
THE COMMON LAW COUNTS
After its discussion of the Subdivision Act, the court said the
remaining issue was whether Sanchez had a right to clear his land of
vegetation. 3 4 The court found that right existed. It then concluded
defendant's use of his land was lawful and reasonable, and there
35
could thus be no negligence or liability to an adjoining landowner.
Establishment of a legal right to clear land apparently supported the
court's earlier statement that no findings had been made "that could
support any theory that defendant owed plaintiffs a duty as to negligence, nuisance or trespass, and that defendant breached that
duty. ' 3 6 The court's conclusion is puzzling because the court did
31. 92 N.M. at 226, 585 P.2d at 1107.
32. Romero v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 11 N.M. 679, 686, 72 P. 37, 39
16 S.W. 487, 488
(1903), citing Oates v. The Union Pacific Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 514, -,
(1891).
33. "It is basic law that when a statute creates a cause of action, and designates those
who may sue thereunder, none except the persons so designated may bring such an action."
-, 379 P.2d 169, 173 (1963),citing
City and County of Denver v. Miller, 151 Colo. 444,
-, 250 P.2d 122 (1952); 39 Am. Jur. Parties §9
Avery v. County Court, 126 Colo. 421,
(1938).
34. 92 N.M. at 227, 585 P.2d at 1108.
35. The court apparently adopted the contention of defendant on appeal that "It is a
well-established common law principle that a landowner has a legal right to clear his own
land of natural brush or vegetation even if the result is the blowing of dirt on to the land of
an adjacent landowner." Appellant's Brief-in-Chief, p. 4.
36. 92 N.M. at 226, 585 P.2d at 1107. It is possible, though, that the court's statement
was meant to indicate the trial court's conclusion that defendant was liable for negligence,
nuisance and trespass was being reversed because the trial court's findings did not support its
conclusions. Judge Hernandez's dissent raises this possibility, since he specifically rejected
the argument: "In my opinion the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence and that [sic] it correctly concluded that defendant's actions constituted a private

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 9

not employ the legal analyses required in nuisance and negligence
actions and failed completely to address the question of trespass.
The Law of Nuisance
Private nuisance is not defined by statute in New Mexico, and is
thus a matter of common law. Under the common law, private nuisance is defined as "an unreasonable interference with the use and
enjoyment of land." 3 " A court must make two determinations in a
nuisance action. First, it must determine whether a defendant has
caused a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of a
plaintiff's land. 3 Secondly, the court must decide whether the
defendant is liable for that substantial interference because his conduct in causing or maintaining the interference was unreasonable
under the circumstances. 3 9
According to Prosser, "w]here the invasion affects the physical
nuisance." 92 N.M. at 229, 585 P.2d at 1110.
If the court of appeals was reversing the trial court's decision on the common law claims
because the findings were insufficient, it should have specifically listed that reason as a
ground for its decision. If it had done so, the court should then have specified in what ways
the findings were insufficient. The findings as summarized by the court seem on their face
sufficient to support all of the common law counts.
37. Sans v. Ramsey Golf and Country Club, Inc. 29 N.J. 438, -, 149 A.2d 599, 605,
68 A.L.R.2d 1323, 1330 (1959). See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts §89 at 591 (4th ed.
1971). No New Mexico case sets out all the elements of private nuisance. Various decisions,
however, discuss separate elements that are required to find nuisance. These cases are
discussed as the different elements are defined.
38. Merriam v. McConnell, 31 IU. App.2d 241,
-, 175 N.E.2d 293, 295, 83 A.L.R.2d
931, 934 (1961); Chnic and Hospital, Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223,
-,
236
S.W.2d 384, 390, 23 A.L.R.2d 1278, 1286 (1951); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336,
-,
198 P.2d 847, 852, 5 A.L.R.2d 690, 698 (1948); Essick v.
Shillam, 347 Pa. 373,
-,
32 A.2d 416, 418, 146 A.L.R. 1399, 1402 (1943). The New
Mexico Supreme Court referred to this step of the analysis in Wofford v. Rudick, 63 N.M.
307, 310, 318 P.2d 605, 607 (1957), when it ruled that although appellees had not established the amount of their damages with exactness, the proof did show that "appellees
suffered substantial damages."
39. Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-Way House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507,
-,
218 A.2d
383, 385, 21 A.L.R.3d 1051, 1056 (1966); Merriam v. McConnell, 31 Ill. App.2d 241, 175
N.E.2d 293, 83 A.L.R.2d 931 (1961); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or.
336, 198 P.2d 847, 5 A.L.R.2d 690 (1948). See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, §87 at 580
(4th ed. 1971) and cases cited therein. Section 822 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1966) delineates four determinants for nuisance liability:
(a) the other person [whose interest in land is invaded] has property rights
and privileges in respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing lability for negligence, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.
These determinants are implicit in this note's discussion of the analysis required by nuisance
law.
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condition of the plaintiff's land, the substantial character of the
interference is seldom in doubt."'4 Substantial interference may be
found when only annoyance or inconvenience is caused, as well as
when physical damage occurs. The amount of damage claimed need
not be great before substantial interference is found. Substantial
4
as
damage was defined in Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative
"' * * * a sum, assessed by way of damages, which is worth
"4 2 In Jost, substantial damage to one plaintiff was
having . ..
found when damages were only $145 for each of two years.
If a court finds there has been substantial interference, it then
must determine whether the defendant is liable for damages because
his creation or maintenance of the interference was unreasonable
under the circumstances. In every determination of reasonableness,
the court must strike a balance between two "antithetical extremes:
The principle that every person is entitled to use his property for any
purpose that he sees fit, and the opposing principle that everyone is
bound to use his property in such a manner as not to injure the
property or rights of his neighbor."4 '
In balancing these opposing principles, the gravity of harm to the
plaintiff must be weighed against the utility of the defendant's conduct.4 4
'

An invasion of plaintiff's interest is unreasonable "unless the utility
of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm." 4 Restatement, Torts, §826, p. 241 .... Some of the specific factors considered in determining the interests of the parties are the extent and
character of harm involved; the social value of the respective uses;
the suitability of each use to the character of the locality in which it
is conducted; the ability of the defendant or plaintiff to prevent or
avoid the harm.4 s
If defendant's conduct has no utility from the standpoint of one of
the factors, the fact that it has utility from the standpoint of other
factors is not controlling. 4 6 Thus, if it is "practicable for the actor to
40. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, §87 at 578 (4th ed. 1971).
41. 45 Wis.2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969).
172 N.W.2d at 651.
42. Id. at-,
, 78 N.E.2d 752, 759 (1947).
43. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465,
-, 149 A.2d 599, 605, 68
44. Sans v. Ramsey Golf and Country Club, 29 N.J. 438,
-, 350 P.2d
A.L.R.2d 1323, 1330 (1959); Gronn v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 221 Or. 226,
1086, 1089 (1960). See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, §89 at 596 (4th ed. 1971) and
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 (1977).
350 P.2d at 1089. See Restatement (Second) of
-,
45. Gronn v. Rogers, 221 Or. at
Torts § § 827 and 828, Comment c (1977); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 89 at 597 (4th
ed. 1971).
46. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 828, Comment b (1965).
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avoid the harm [to plaintiff] in whole or in part without undue
hardship,"'7 the defendant's invasion of plaintiff's interests is unreasonable.
The assessment of these factors will vary over time, since "[tihe
court should take into consideration public policy, [and] the interests of the community as a whole ... .
As public policy evolves,
courts may find that a defendant is liable for nuisance although the
same conduct twenty years earlier would not have been viewed as
unreasonable. "For generations, courts, in their tasks of judging, have
ruled on these extremes according to the wisdom of the day, and
many have recognized that the contemporary view of public policy
shifts from generation to generation." 4
New Mexico courts have not expressly employed a balancing test,
nor have they discussed the factors which influence their decisions in
nuisance cases. In Phillips v. Allingham,50 however, the court assessed the defendant's conduct by many of the factors listed above
and acknowledged the public policy supporting defendant's activity.
Plaintiffs in Phillips sued to enjoin defendant from constructing gasoline storage tanks on his property, claiming such tanks would be a
nuisance per se. The court reversed a granting of an injunction after
considering that the defendant was locating the tanks on industriallyzoned property, that the tanks met acceptable construction criteria
and that the proposed method of handling gasoline was safe. It also
cited another case involving gasoline storage in which an injunction
would have restrained " 'the defendants from supplying a public
need .. . "' 1
Because many factors are involved and because the weight given
those factors varies as public policy evolves, " 'nuisance cannot be
determined by any fixed general rules, but depend[s] upon the facts
of each particular case . .' ,s2 As Justice Holmes said: "The respective rights and liabilities of adjoining land-owners cannot be determined in advance by a mathematical line, or a general for47. Id., § 830. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, §89 at 599 (4th ed. 1971), and Sans v.
Ramsey Golf and Country Club, 29 N.J. 438, 149 A.2d 599, 68 A.L.R.2d 1323 (1959) (the
appellate court drew attention to the slight burden on defendant to avoid the harm to
plaintiff).
48. 58 Am. Jur.2d Nuisances §23 (1971).
49. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. at-,
78 N.E.2d at 759.
50. 38 N.M. 361, 33 P.2d 910 (1934).
51. Id. at 367, 33 P.2d at 914 [quoting from City of Electra v. Cross, 225 S.W. 795, 796
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920)].
52. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336,
-, 198 P.2d 847, 852, 5
A.L.R.2d at 698 (1948) [quoting from 39 Am. Jur. Nuisances § 16 (1938)]. See W. Prosser,
The Law of Torts, §89 at 602 (4th ed. 1971).
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mula . . . . ,, Because of this, "the cases are often of little value
except as a general guide to the principles involved." 4
Courts sometimes err when they fail to recognize that reasonableness can be determined only by an inquiry into the particular facts of
each case. Two common errors should be considered before turning
to the court's decision in Gabaldon. One error is to assume that a
defendant's conduct is reasonable if he was making legal use of his
property. "[T] he fact that an act may otherwise be lawful may not
prevent it from constituting a nuisance' s ' when considered with all
the circumstances of a case. The second error is to assert that a
defendant's lack of negligence precludes liability for nuisance.
"[L]iability for nuisance does not depend upon the question of
negligence ... and may exist although there was no negligence. '"56
New Mexico courts have recognized that the focus in nuisance cases
is not on the quality of the act or omission which leads to the
invasion of property interests. "Care or want of care is not involved.
Whether there was a wrongful invasion of property rights is the question, not whether it was negligently done."' ' Liability for nuisance
can exist "regardless of the degree of care exercised to avoid in5
jury." 8

Though the court of appeals quoted case law which reflects the
common law nuisance principles outlined above, it did not apply
those principles. The court did not address the question of whether
there had been substantial interference with the Gabaldons' use and
enjoyment of their land. The court may have assumed that substantial damage was shown, and its references to reasonable and lawful
conduct may have been a conclusion that defendant was not liable
for any damage because his conduct was reasonable. Since substantial
interference is usually found whenever any actual physical harm to
land or any real damage is caused,5 I it is unlikely the Gabaldons'
damages would not meet the requirement of substantial interference.
If the court did determine that Sanchez's conduct in causing the
substantial interference was reasonable, it did not do so by balancing
the factors traditionally reviewed in nuisance cases. The court quoted
53. Middlesex v. McCue, 149 Mass. 102,
-,
21 N.E. 230, 231 (1889). The court of
appeals included this quotation in Gabaldon, 92 N.M. at 228, 585 P.2d at 1109.
54. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 89 at 602 (4th ed. 1971).
55. 58 Am. Jur.2d Nuisances § 28 (1971). See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 87 at 575
(4th ed. 1971).
56. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677, 684 (Okla. 1958). See W. Prosser, The
Law of Torts, §87 at 574 (4th ed. 1971).
57. Wofford v. Rudick, 63 N.M. 307, 311, 318 P.2d 605, 608 (1957).
58. Id.
59. See text accompanying notes 39 through 41 supra.
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extensively from cases in which courts had found there was no liability for negligence or nuisance when windblown sand from stripped
land damaged another's property. 60 The court apparently found in
the cases cited a set principle of nuisance law regarding blowing sand,
despite the express recognition even in the cases it cited that nuisance law can seldom be made a matter of definite rule, but must in
every case be determined from the facts. 6 '
The court made no mention of the special weight given to public
policy in nuisance cases. It did not indicate whether the courts in the
cases it reviewed had shown any concern about wind erosion and
protection of the environment. No defendant in any of the cited
cases was bound by a government regulation to institute special terrain programs to tie down his soil. The Subdivision Act indicates
Sanchez violated the public policy in New Mexico to protect land
from abusive subdivision activities.
In addition to the failure to refer to any balancing test or consider
public policy, two other errors are implicit in the court's opinion. In
its discussion of nuisance and negligence, the court concluded that
"defendant had the legal right to remove brush and vegetation from
his land and was not negligent in removing them." ' 6 2 That conclusion
alone does not negate actionable nuisance. Nuisance may be found
even if a defendant exercises a legal right in a non-negligent man6
ner. 3
While even lawful conduct may give rise to nuisance, the court
failed to explain why it concluded that Sanchez's subdivision activity
was lawful. It may be inferred from its opinion that the court assumed every property owner has the legal right to clear his land. The
court buttressed this common sense assumption with dicta from
other cases. If Sanchez's activity, however, had been defined as something other than "clearing land," it could have been found to be
unlawful. The Subdivision Act requires subdividers to comply with
the terrain management plans described in their disclosure state60. If the court wished to find precedent for an opposite conclusion, it could have cited
Waters v. McNierney, 185 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1959), aff'd 202 N.Y.2d 808 (1960). The court
there upheld a finding of nuisance on facts similar to those in Gabaldon. The defendant had
cleared his land to construct a golf course. Exposed sand blew onto plaintiffs property,
accumulating in substantial amounts. The sand interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment
of land and necessitated cleaning and painting their house. The court ruled that since
plaintiffs' damages were substantial, the "appellant's conduct could be classified as unreasonable and a nuisance and ... damages were properly awarded." 185 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
New York's position-that the defendant's conduct is unreasonable if the plaintiffs damages are substantial -represents, however, a minority viewpoint. See text accompanying
notes 38 through 43 supra.
61. See text accompanying notes 51 through 53 supra.
62. 92 N.M. at 228, 585 P.2d at 1109 (emphasis added).
63. See text accompanying notes 54 through 57 supra.

Summer 1979]

GABALDON V. SANCHEZ

ments; therefore, Sanchez was arguably acting unlawfully in clearing
his land without re-vegetating it.
The Law of Negligence
The court's conclusion that Sanchez was not negligent was also
unsubstantiated. Some legal phrases from negligence law, such as
"ordinary care" and "negligence," do surface occasionally in the
court's opinion. The court did cite defendant's argument that there
was no "breach of duty owing by defendant to plaintiffs," 6 4 and did
say the defendant was not negligent in removing vegetation. 6 5
The court, however, neither defined negligence nor undertook the
applicable analysis. If the court was applying negligence principles
without verbalizing its analysis, then it erred again in its use of the
term "reasonable" and also did not consider the standard of conduct
required of subdividers.
Negligence is "conduct which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm." 6 6 The reasonableness of the risk of harm is determined by
"weighing the magnitude of the risk against the utility of the [defendant's] act or the particular manner" '6 7 in which the act is done.
Factors which determine the utility of defendant's conduct and the
magnitude of risk are similar to those used in nuisance cases. The
utility of defendant's conduct is assessed in part by the social value
attached by law to the interest advanced by a defendant's conduct
and the availability of any alternate, less dangerous course of conduct that would adequately advance the interest. 6 ' The magnitude
of risk depends in part on the social value of the interest imperiled
by the defendant's conduct and the extent of harm likely to be
caused to that interest. 6 9 Reasonableness is not determined solely by
the legality of a person's conduct. The court's decision is incorrect to
the extent it rested on a conclusion that Sanchez's conduct was
reasonable because it was lawful.
64. 92 N.M. at 226, 585 P.2d at 1107.
65. Id. at 228, 585 P.2d at 1109.
66. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 (1965). See Flanary v. Transport Stop, 78 N.M.
796, 800, 438 P.2d 636, 640 (Ct. App. 1968): ' An act may be negligent if a reasonably
prudent person would foresee that the act involves an unreasonable risk of injury to another
and the reasonably prudent person, in the exercise of ordinary care would not do that act."
67. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 778 (5th Cir. 1952). See Schance
v. H. 0. Adams Tile Co., 131 Cal. App.2d 549, 555, 280 P.2d 851, 855 (1955); Winsor v.
-,
171 P.2d 251, 254 (1946). See RestateSmart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wash.2d 383,
ment (Second) of Torts § 291 (1965). See also United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
68. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 292 (1965).
69. Id.
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If the court had employed the required balancing test, the Subdivision Act might have been used to assess the social value attached to
clearing land for subdivisions without re-vegetating it. Clearing land
for subdivisions may have economic and social value, but New Mexico circumscribed that value by defining acceptable subdivision
methods and practices in the Subdivision Act. New Mexico requires a
terrain management plan from subdividers; Valencia County approved Sanchez's subdivision on the basis of a disclosure statement
which included a terrain management plan promising re-vegetation.
The court should have addressed the issue of whether Sanchez's land
clearing activity, when coupled with his failure to re-vegetate the
land, had any social value in the face of the Subdivision Act.
The Subdivision Act could also have guided the court if it had
attempted to determine the standard of conduct requiredof Sanchez
in developing his land. The unexcused violation of a statute may be
viewed as negligence in itself if a court adopts a legislative standard
"as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man," or it may
be "relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct." 7
The court could have adopted the Subdivision Act as setting the
standard of conduct required of Sanchez. Then Sanchez's violation
of the Subdivision Act would have been negligence per se if the court
had found that the Act was designed in whole or in part to protect
property owners with land adjoining subdivisions from damage to
their land caused by blowing dirt from cleared subdivision land. 7
In discussing plaintiffs' inability to claim damages under the Subdivision Act, the court rejected the contention that the Act was
designed to protect landowners like plaintiffs from the damage they
suffered. The court said the statute does not "refer to adjoining
landowners directly or indirectly, nor to sand and dirt blowing on
adjacent property ....

We are unable to agree with plaintiffs that

the Act was designed to protect landowners owning land adjoining
land being subdivided." 7 2
The court apparently overlooked Section 47-6-7 of the Subdivision Act. 7 That section outlines the procedures a board of county
commissioners must follow in approving the vacating of any ap70. Id. at §288B. See Sanchez v. J. Barron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 722, 427 P.2d 240,
244 (1967): "Violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se and when as a proximate result thereof a person is injured, damages may be recovered if the statute or ordinance
violated was for the benefit of the person injured." See also Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons,
Inc., 296 F.2d 623, 626 (2nd Cir. 1961) (the court upheld using breach of regulations as
evidence of negligence).
71. Sanchez v. J. Barron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 722, 427 P.2d 240, 244 (1967).
72. 92 N.M. at -, 585 P.2d at 1107.
73. N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-6-7 (1978).
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proved subdivision plat. It directs the board to determine "whether
or not the vacation will adversely affect the interests of persons' 7on4
contiguous land or persons within the subdivision being vacated. "
So while the Subdivision Act may have been designed primarily as a
consumer protection measure, 7" the Legislature also had the interests of adjoining landowners in mind.
The Subdivision Act provides no express protection from blowing
dirt to anyone-either purchaser or adjoining landowner. The Valencia County Subdivision Regulations, however, which were enacted
pursuant to the Subdivision Act, include a terrain management provision aimed at reducing erosion due to land clearing:
A. All grading, clearing and filling operations ...shall be de-

signed to ....
2. Retain native vegetation, reduce erosion ...

B. Whenever the native ground cover is removed or disturbed, or
whenever fill material is placed on the site, the exposed surface shall
to reasonably minimize erosion from the exposed matebe treated
76
rial.
The Valencia County regulations were patterned after model regulations prepared by the New Mexico Association of Counties [hereinafter the Association] and the Natural Resource Conservation Commission. 7 7 An explanation accompanying the model regulations
emphasizes that stringent terrain management requirements are necessary because of the state's high susceptibility to erosion.7 The
Association provided references for its model regulations. 79 For the
terrain management provisions, including the Valencia County provision cited above, the Association referred to N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ § 73-22-1 to 73-22-5 (1978). This statute authorizes the creation of
wind erosion districts empowered to require persons to take mea74. N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-6-7(B) (1978).
75. New Mexico Legislative Council Service, Information Memorandum No. 202.23929a.
On file at Sierra Club office in Santa Fe, N.M.
76. Land Subdivision Regulations of Valencia County, New Mexico, Article XIX, p. 49.
Reference is to the regulations adopted Oct. 1, 1973. They were in force at the time
Sanchez obtained approval for his subdivision, but have since been replaced by new regulations.
77. A County Handbook of Model Subdivision Regulations and Information: Terrain
Management Edition. Copy loaned to author by Salomon Montano, Administrative Assistant, Valencia County.
78. Id. at 89.
79. Memo of June 18, 1973, from Philip D. Larragoite, Executive Director of New
Mexico Assn. of Counties, to All County Officials, etc. On file at Sierra Club office in Santa
Fe, N.M.
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sures to reduce wind erosion when it begins to damage the land of
adjoining property owners." 0
The court of appeals, relying on the Subdivision Act and the
Valencia County Subdivision Regulations,8 1 could have concluded
that the plaintiffs were in a class which the statute was designed to
protect, rather than reaching the decision it did in Gabaldon. If it
had done so, Sanchez's failure to re-vegetate his land would have
been negligence per se and he would have been liable to the Gabaldons.
If the court had reviewed the Subdivision Act provisions and
county regulations cited above and yet rejected any contention that
the Subdivision Act defined the standard of conduct required of
Sanchez, it could still have used the Act as evidence on the issue of
negligent conduct. Even if it was not enacted to protect adjacent
landowners from blowing sand, the statute could still be used to
indicate that a reasonable man, or more specifically the reasonable
subdivider in New Mexico, would have undertaken terrain manage8
ment. 2
The Law of Trespass
The court did not undertake any analysis of the trial court's conclusion that Sanchez was also liable to the Gabaldons for trespass. In
its introductory statements the court said the trial court had made
no findings that "could support any theory that defendant owed
plaintiffs a duty as to negligence, nuisance or trespass, and that
defendant breached that duty. '"83

If trespass analysis was framed in terms of "duty," 8 4 then every
person could be said to owe a duty to any person with a possessory
interest in property not to intentionally invade the other's property.
An actor is liable for trespass if "he intentionally . . . enters land in

the possession of [another], or causes a thing or a third person to do
so ...irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any
legally protected interest of the other ... "8 5 An invasion is inten-

tionally caused if an actor desires to cause the invasion, or if he acts
knowing that the invasion is substantially certain to follow. One
80. Id. at 94.
81. N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-6-7 (1978). the Valencia County Subdivision Regulations, and
the County Handbook were not drawn to the court's attention.
82. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B, Comment d (1965).
83. 92 N.M. at
-,585 P.2d at 1107.
84. " 'Duty' is rarely used in dealing with the invasions of legally protected interests by
acts which are intended to invade them." Restatement (Second) of Torts §4, Comment b
(1965).
85. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965).
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court held a defendant liable for damages caused by invasion of
invisible gases and microscopic particles from a factory's exhaust
fumes when the defendant knew the wind was substantially certain
to blow the particles and gases across the plaintiff's land.' 6
Even a sketchy summary of the black letter law of trespass supports
the trial court's conclusion that Sanchez was liable for trespass. He
stripped his land of vegetation though any reasonable person would
have been substantially certain that, given New Mexico's winds and
aridity, dirt from his land would be blown onto the Gabaldon property. The trial court did not even have to hold Sanchez to the knowledge that a reasonable person would have had about wind erosion in
New Mexico in order to find intentional conduct. Since Sanchez
cleared the Gabaldons' ditch of sand twice, he was well aware of the
damage being caused by his failure to re-vegetate his subdivision. The
trial court's conclusion should not have been reversed without some
discussion of the law of trespass and reasons for the reversal.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals erred in its discussion of negligence and
nuisance law, and in its failure to address the issue of trespass. The
court did not apply the balancing tests required under both nuisance
and negligence law, nor did it even indicate such tests were required
to decide the "reasonableness" of defendant's actions. Only a determination of reasonableness could support the court's conclusion that
defendant owed plaintiffs no duty under the law.
Few cases of nuisance, negligence involving land use, or trespass
have been decided in New Mexico. It is unfortunate that Gabaldon v.
Sanchez was so summarily decided. It has the potential of clouding
New Mexico law for years because the court failed to adequately
discuss and analyze the law that was at issue.
MARY E. BOUDREAU

86. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company, 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied
362 U.S. 918 (1960). See discussion in W. Prosser, The Law of Torts §13 at p. 66 (4th ed.
1971).

